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We  investigate  whether  there  is  an  association  between  conditional  cooperation  and
betrayal  aversion,  two  phenomena  that  we conjecture  share  common  psychological  char-
acteristics  despite  having  been  studied  largely  separately  in the  previous  literature.  We
use a  public  goods  game  to  categorize  subjects  by type  of contribution  preference  and  we
measure  betrayal  aversion  for different  categories  of  subject.  We report  three  studies,  using
two different  methods  to measure  betrayal  aversion:  a standard  elicitation  with  monetary
incentives  and  a novel  scenario-based  measure  that  we argue  addresses  concerns  about
the standard  measure.  We  ﬁnd  strong  and  robust  evidence  of an association  between  con-
ditional  cooperation  and  betrayal  aversion  in the scenario-based  measures  but not  in  the
standard  measure.
©  2017  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the
CC BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The voluntary provision of public goods is an important economic problem where, notoriously, collective welfare and
individual interest diverge. If economic agents are rational and self-interested, public goods will be underprovided, relative
to the efﬁcient benchmark (Samuelson, 1954; Hardin, 1968). However, empirical evidence from lab and ﬁeld studies shows
that (i) many people are to some extent willing to provide public goods voluntarily and (ii) those who are willing to do so
are mostly “conditional cooperators”, that is, they contribute to the public good only if they expect other group members to
do so as well (see Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for overviews).
 This work was  supported by Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/K002201/1], Network for Integrated Behavioural Science and
support under ERC-AdG 295707 COOPERATION is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Ben Beranek, Martin Kocher, Felix Kölle, Lucas Molleman, Daniele
Nosenzo, Jonathan Schulz, Chris Starmer, Till Weber, Ori Weisel, an editor and two referees for helpful comments.
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Nottingham, School of Economics, Sir Clive Granger Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United
Kingdom.
E-mail addresses: robin.cubitt@nottingham.ac.uk (R. Cubitt), simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk (S. Gächter), simone.quercia@uni-bonn.de (S. Quercia).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.013
0167-2681/© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/).
a
p
r
(
t
2
Z
b
A
t
a
e
a
t
t
(
D
p
c
W
h
t
b
t
c
a
“
p
t
p
i
c
F
g
a
t
S
2
2
o
s
i
v
w
B
(R. Cubitt et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 141 (2017) 110–121 111
This leaves open what drives people to be conditional cooperators. One psychological motive behind conditional cooper-
tion may  be that unconditional cooperation entails the risk of being exploited by free riders; and conditional cooperation
rotects against this exploitation. This attitude to cooperation suggests that conditional cooperators might be generally
eluctant to take social risks deﬁned as risky choices where (i) the outcome is caused intentionally by another person and
ii) this person can exploit the risk-taker.
In this paper, we investigate this psychological motive empirically by linking conditional cooperation to another concept
hat has been closely related to willingness to take social risks of this form, namely betrayal aversion. As we  discuss in Section
.1, the idea of betrayal aversion has roots in psychology but was  introduced into the economics literature by Bohnet and
eckhauser (2004) as greater reluctance of people to take social risks associated with trusting another person, compared to a
enchmark of corresponding natural risks (where the outcome is determined by nature, independently of human decisions).1
 difference in willingness to take these kinds of risk might arise, for example, if people anticipate an emotional cost that
hey would suffer on top of the material costs, if their trust is betrayed.
We conjecture that, despite being developed largely independently, the concepts of conditional cooperation and betrayal
version share common psychological characteristics. First, as just indicated each of betrayal aversion and conditional coop-
ration can be interpreted in terms of reluctance to take social risks as deﬁned above. For example, besides driving betrayal
version, anticipation of emotional cost of betrayal could be a characteristic of conditional cooperators, as their attitude
owards cooperation reveals they are only willing to cooperate conditionally on not being exploited. Second, both condi-
ional cooperation and betrayal aversion are in line with the evidence that subjects care about intentions on top of outcomes
see, e.g., Blount (1995), Falk et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2008); and for theoretical accounts of such concerns see, e.g.,
ufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006)). In particular, psychological motives such as reci-
rocity could explain why people are reluctant to take the risk of intentional exploitation (betrayal aversion, reluctance to
ontribute if others do not) and why they want to reciprocate by cooperating if others do cooperate (conditional cooperation).
hile the link between trust and cooperation has been studied before,2 we are the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to investigate
ow betrayal aversion relates to and inhibits cooperation.
We present the results of three experimental studies that investigate the relation between betrayal aversion and condi-
ional cooperation. Our strategy, common to all three studies, is to measure cooperation preferences using a tool provided
y Fischbacher et al. (2001) and to relate them to some measure of betrayal aversion. However, we vary the method used
o measure betrayal aversion, starting with a classic approach and then introducing a new method. We  discuss the pros and
ons of each method in Section 2.2.
Study 1, which we describe in Section 3, uses the techniques of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) to detect betrayal aversion
nd the tools of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to measure preferences for cooperation and to classify subjects into cooperation
types”. We  took this approach for our ﬁrst study in order to replicate the existing classic designs. Studies 2 and 3, which we
resent in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, introduce a novel form of instrument to measure betrayal aversion that attempts
o solve potential problems of the Bohnet and Zeckhauser method, discussed in Section 2.2 and Aimone and Houser (2012).
Our ﬁndings provide strong evidence of an association between our second measure of betrayal aversion and cooperation
references elicited with techniques of Fischbacher et al. (2001). As those techniques are held constant across our analyses
n Sections 3–5, we report checks the robustness of our ﬁndings in Section 6, by varying and enriching the typology of
ontribution preferences that Fischbacher et al. (2001) provide. In doing the latter, we address the potential concern that
ischbacher et al. (2001)’s use of “contribution tables” – in which subjects can condition their choices in a public goods
ame on those of others – may  neutralise strategic uncertainty. Since that may attenuate the role of social risk, we also use
 further measure of social risk taking in the public goods game. We  ﬁnd evidence that this further measure of social risk
aking mediates the relation between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion in Study 1, but not in Studies 2 and 3.
ection 7 summarizes the results and concludes.
. Conceptualization and measurement of betrayal aversion
.1. Conceptualization
Like Aimone et al. (2015, p. 2), we conceptualise betrayal aversion as “disutility from the experience, anticipation or
bservation of non-reciprocated trust”, thereby equating betrayal with breach of trust. Such disutility could have several
ources, such as emotional cost from experience or anticipation of the act of betrayal, or negative response to presumed
ntentions of the betrayer. Moreover, as Aimone et al. (2015) point out, the disutility could in principle be inferred from
arious different types of behavior, including stated disapproval of betrayal (or of betrayers) or avoidance of situations in
hich betrayal might occur (see, e.g., Koehler and Gershoff (2003)).
1 Betrayal aversion and, more generally, aversion to social risks have also been investigated by, for example, Koehler and Gershoff (2003), Hong and
ohnet (2007), Bohnet et al. (2008), Gershoff and Koehler (2011), Aimone and Houser (2011), Aimone and Houser (2012), Fetchenhauer and Dunning
2012), Lauharatanahirun et al. (2012), Aimone and Houser (2013), Dreber et al. (2013), Butler and Miller (2014), and Aimone et al. (2015).
2 See for example Gächter et al. (2004), Thöni et al. (2012) and Balliet and Van Lange (2013) for a meta-analysis.
112 R. Cubitt et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 141 (2017) 110–121
The approach to detecting betrayal aversion that we take follows that of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Bohnet et al.
(2008) in inferring the aversion from greater reluctance to take social risks than corresponding natural risks, where social
risks arise from the possibility that another person intentionally exploits the risk taker and natural risks arise from acts of
nature. As we explain in more detail below, in Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s design, social risk is instantiated by the play of a
(human) second mover in a Trust Game and the corresponding natural risk by a move of nature in what is, from the ﬁrst
mover’s perspective, an otherwise identical decision problem known as the Risky Dictator Game. In line with this, and as
indicated in Section 1, we adopt a conception of social risk that requires both intentional human agency and the possibility
of exploitation.3 We  use such a conception throughout.
In contrast, some authors – such as Lauharatanahirun et al. (2012) – have studied social risks which depend on human
agency, but not exploitation. They assess (neural) response to such risks, as compared with corresponding natural risks, by
studying the impact of whether or not the risk is framed as resolved by a person or by a roulette wheel. Their implementation
of social risk differs from Bohnet and Zeckhauser’s games because the person resolving the social risk does not stand to gain
from resolving it one way or the other, so the possibility of exploitation is removed. We  accept that there are forms of risk that
are resolved by social behaviors that are not motivated by desire to exploit. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is appropriate
to conﬁne attention to social risks which do stem from the possibility of exploitation via opportunist acts of others, as our
goal is to investigate whether there is a relationship between betrayal aversion and conditional cooperation in relation to
public goods. When someone contributes to a public good and ﬁnds that others have not, the free riders have beneﬁtted in
material terms at the expense of the contributor, so exploitation is present.
Other authors, such as Koehler and Gershoff (2003), consider aversion to “betrayals” that – at ﬁrst sight – do not require
the betrayer to be human or capable of intention. Koehler and Gershoff (2003) are particularly interested in a form of betrayal
that arises when an entity obligated to protect causes the harm that it is supposed to protect from (as, for example, when a
security guard steals from her employer or an exploding airbag injures a driver). Though they insist (p. 245) that “Because
inanimate objects are incapable of intentionality ., they cannot really betray our trust”, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) also
argue that products such as medicines and safety devices may  “seem to betray us when they cause the very harms they were
designed to guard against” (emphases in original). They term such cases “object betrayals” and report evidence for aversion
to them based, for example, on subjects’ judgments of appropriate penalties for the suppliers of the malfunctioning products.
A natural interpretation – which preserves the principle that only agents capable of intention can really be betrayers – is that
aversion to “object betrayal” reﬂects a feeling of being let down by the designer or supplier of the object.4 However, we  do
not need to insist on this interpretation or to pursue further the – ultimately philosophical – question of whether inanimate
objects can betray. In our studies, we use forms of social risk that arise from intentional acts of conscious agents because
these are the kinds of social risk aversion to which might plausibly drive conditional cooperation in public goods problems
in human societies.5
2.2. Measurement
Consistently with our conceptualisation, we use two  different methods to measure betrayal aversion. The ﬁrst is the
method introduced by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004). It consists of a between subjects comparison of behavior across two
games. In the ﬁrst game, the Trust Game, a ﬁrst mover chooses between a safe option and a risky option under which a
second mover can intentionally exploit them or reward their trust. The second game, called Risky Dictator Game, has the
same structure as the Trust Game except that the outcome of the risky option is determined by nature with probabilities
unknown at the time of the ﬁrst mover’s decision.
The design elicits and compares across treatments minimum acceptance probabilities (MAPs), i.e., the minimum prob-
abilities of a favorable outcome from the risky option that the ﬁrst mover requires to accept that option rather than the
safe one. A higher MAP  in the Trust Game compared to the Risky Dictator Game was interpreted by Bohnet and Zeckhauser
(2004) as evidence for betrayal aversion. To make the elicitation of MAPs incentive-compatible the design uses a version of
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (BDM, Becker et al. (1964)): each MAP  is compared with a probability p and if
the MAP  is higher than or equal to p, the ﬁrst mover is deemed to choose the risky option, while if the MAP  is below p they
are deemed to choose the safe option. The probability p is equal to the fraction of trustworthy second movers in the Trust
Game and to a predetermined and unknown probability in the Risky Dictator Game.
The MAP  design has the advantage of being an incentivized behavioral measure, but it presents several potential concerns
related both to the BDM mechanism in general and to its speciﬁc use in the context of betrayal aversion.
3 In some (e.g. ﬁctional) contexts, a third element is often present in betrayal, namely breach of an explicit promise. We  follow the social science literature
in  allowing breach of trust not to involve broken explicit promises. The complexity of normative expectations that social agents may  have of one another
precludes seeing them as completely codiﬁed in explicit promises.
4 Besides conforming to the quotations from Koehler and Gershoff (2003) that we  have given, this interpretation ﬁts well with the punishments assigned
by  subjects in their Study 3 being punishments of the supplier of the object that has failed, not of the object itself.
5 In this discussion, we have conﬂated intentional human agency and intentional agency, for brevity and for direct applicability to our experiments (in
which  the only intentional actors are human) and main concerns (human societies). We intend no position on whether trust, betrayal and social risk can
feature in non-human societies.
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First, from a theoretical standpoint, the BDM mechanism is incentive compatible only under expected-utility theory (see
arni and Safra (1987) and Horowitz (2006) for discussions on the incentive compatibility of the mechanism). Even under
he assumption that subjects’ ‘true’ preferences conform to expected utility theory, the mechanism may  be empirically
nreliable due to misperceptions of the incentive structure (Cason and Plott (2014)).6
Second, in the speciﬁc setting of betrayal aversion, the mechanism may  generate even more confusion than in standard
ontingent valuation settings as it requires the elicitation of a probability rather than a price, which arguably increases its
ifﬁculty (Quercia (2016)).
Third, Aimone and Houser (2012) noticed that if subjects’ expectations about the actual level of trustworthiness in the
rust Game differ from their expectations of the unknown probability p in the Risky Dictator Game, differences between
APs across treatments could arise due to different expectation-based reference points coupled with loss aversion rather
han betrayal aversion.
Finally, while the BDM mechanism may  be appropriate to elicit consumers’ valuations for products, it might be too ‘emo-
ionally’ cold in the context of a social phenomenon such as betrayal aversion. If, as mentioned in the Introduction, betrayal
version stems from the anticipation of negative emotional feelings, the highly cognitive nature of the BDM mechanism
ight obfuscate the salience of these emotional reactions to anticipated betrayal.
Our second measure for betrayal aversion responds to the problems of the MAP  method, without departing from our
onceptualisation. In particular, we design two hypothetical scenarios (“vignettes”) where subjects choose between two  taxi
ompanies. In both vignettes, one taxi company is a safe choice as it charges always a ﬁxed fare; while the other company,
hat charges customers according to the taxi meter, is a risky choice and it can generate a higher or a lower cost (compared
o the safe company) with known probabilities. The two  vignettes differ just in the source of risk. In one case, the possibility
nd associated probability of a high cost is due to circumstances outside the driver’s control, while in the other case it is due
o the intention of the taxi driver to cheat the customer. Our measure of betrayal aversion is the between-subjects difference
n the frequency of the safe choice between the two vignettes.
This measure has several advantages. First, it reduces complexity by inferring betrayal aversion from a simple, easy to
nderstand, choice between two commonplace options, rather than from a threshold probability under a complex incentive
tructure in an unfamiliar decision. Second, we provide subjects with the exact probability of betrayal (bad luck), thus
ontrolling for different expectations across the two vignettes. Third, due to the contextual frame, the cause of betrayal
i.e. intentional exploitation) is made psychologically very salient. Finally, it is worth noticing that betrayal aversion was
rst elicited experimentally by Koehler and Gershoff (2003) using subjects’ responses to simple non-incentivized scenarios
here betrayal motives were also psychologically salient. Our second measure goes back to that elicitation principle. Besides
eviving an approach from the early betrayal aversion literature in this respect, it also echoes a small but important tradition
n economics (see, e.g., Kahneman et al. (1986) for a classic and highly inﬂuential study on fairness judgements, using
ypothetical scenarios).
. Study 1–investigating the relation between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion
.1. Experimental design and procedures
The design of Study 1 is composed of two parts: Part 1 elicits betrayal aversion replicating the design Bohnet and
eckhauser (2004); Part 2 measures subjects’ attitudes to cooperation following Fischbacher et al. (2001). In each case,
e describe game payoffs in each part in terms of “points”, for comparability with other studies. (Points were converted to
ash at the end of each session.)
.1.1. Part 1–betrayal aversion
The core of the design of Part 1 is a between-subjects comparison of behavior in two  games: the Trust Game and the Risky
ictator Game (henceforth TG and RDG) whose extensive forms are presented in Fig. 1.7 Subjects are randomly matched
n pairs and assigned the roles of ﬁrst movers and counterpart second movers in TG or, respectively, of ﬁrst movers and
ounterpart recipients in RDG. In both games, the ﬁrst mover chooses between a certain and a risky option. The certain
ption gives 10 points to him and to his counterpart. The risky option can produce either an unequal outcome of 8 points to
he ﬁrst mover and 22 to his counterpart or an equal split giving 15 points to both.While in TG the outcome of the risky option is determined by a second mover and the ﬁrst mover is exposed to the risk of
etrayal, in RDG the betrayal and social components are removed by letting the outcome be determined by a random draw
ith the probabilities of outcomes (15; 15) and (8; 22) being p and 1-p, respectively.
6 For further discussion of the distinction between theoretical and behavioral incentive compatibility, see Bardsley et al. (2010, chapter 6.5).
7 The original Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) design consists of three between-subjects treatments called Trust Game, Risky Dictator Game and Decision
roblem. The comparison between choices made in the ﬁrst and the second treatment measures betrayal aversion, while the comparison between choices
ade  in the second and in the third measures social preferences. As we are mainly interested in measuring betrayal aversion, we implemented only TG
nd  RDG.
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In our experimental implementation of TG, ﬁrst and second movers take decisions at the same time; second movers’
decisions are elicited using the strategy method (Selten (1967)), i.e., each second mover is asked whether he would choose
Left or Right if their ﬁrst mover chooses In. In RDG, recipients are asked to wait for the decision of ﬁrst movers and do not
take any action.
For ﬁrst movers in both TG and RDG, we elicit the lowest probability of the outcome (15; 15) at which he would choose
In instead of Out. Following Bohnet et al. (2008), we  call this value the minimum acceptance probability (MAP). Betrayal
aversion is measured as the difference between average MAPs across the two treatments, that is, BA = MAPTG − MAPRDG . If
the average MAP  in the TG is higher than that in the RDG, ﬁrst movers are on average betrayal averse.
To elicit MAPs incentive compatibly, we use two different versions of the BDM mechanism: an open-ended version that
asks subjects directly their threshold probability and uses the same instructions and procedures as Bohnet et al. (2008)8
and a choice list version (documented in the web appendix) that uses frequencies instead of probabilities. In both cases,
subjects have an incentive to reveal their “true” preference value under expected utility theory (see Bohnet and Zeckhauser
(2004) for a discussion of the incentive compatibility of the design). In a companion paper, Quercia (2016) compares these
two versions of the BDM mechanism in the context of the elicitation of betrayal aversion. One of the main ﬁndings is that
the two versions do not produce signiﬁcantly different levels of betrayal aversion. Given this result, in this paper we pool
the data from the two elicitation methods.
3.1.2. Part 2 – conditional cooperation
Part 2 uses the design introduced by Fischbacher et al. (2001), in which a variant of the strategy method is employed to
elicit subjects’ attitudes towards cooperation in a specially designed public goods game. Participants are randomly assigned
to groups of four subjects and endowed with 20 tokens, each of which they may  either keep for themselves or contribute to
a “project”. The following payoff function deﬁnes the material incentives subjects face:
yi = 20 − xi + 0.4
4∑
i=1
xj
where yi are player i’s earnings in points and xi denotes the contribution of player i to the project. As any token not contributed
by a group member increases his/her payoff by 1 point, while any token contributed increases every group member’s payoff
by 0.4, it is individually optimal to contribute no tokens to the project but socially optimal to contribute every token to it.
Subjects have to make an “unconditional contribution” and a “conditional contribution”. In the unconditional contribution,
subjects are simply asked how much they contribute to the project. In the conditional contribution task, participants are asked
to ﬁll out a contribution table specifying a contribution decision for each possible average contribution (rounded to integers)
of the other three subjects in their group. Thus, for each participant their contribution table consists of 21 entries (one for
each possible average from 0 to 20). After all participants have completed the unconditional and conditional contribution
tasks, we elicit each participant’s belief about the average unconditional contribution of the other three members in their
group.9
8 This study extends Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) including a cross-cultural comparison of the original US sample of Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004)
to ﬁve samples from different countries. We draw our instructions which are the same as Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) from Bohnet et al. (2008)’s web
appendix (http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/mar08/20051024 app.pdf). We thank the authors for also making their control questions available.
9 We follow Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) regarding the mechanism to incentivize beliefs: for each correct belief the participants earned 3 points, for
each  belief that deviated by 1(2) point from the correct estimate the participants earned 2(1) points.
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Table  1
Betrayal aversion according to cooperation types (Std. Dev. in brackets).
MAPTG MAPRDG MAPTG − MAPRDG p-value
All (n = 273) 0.52 [0.22] 0.47 [0.20] 0.05 0.031
Conditional cooperators (n = 163) 0.53 [0.21] 0.47 [0.20] 0.06 0.109
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(Free  riders (n = 70) 0.50 [0.22] 0.43 [0.20] 0.07 0.178
Others (n = 40) 0.54 [0.24] 0.50 [0.18] 0.04 0.506
ote: p-values based on Mann-Whitney U (MWU)  test.
The incentives are as follows: one group member is randomly selected in each group and their conditional decision is
ayoff relevant while for the other three group members their unconditional contributions are payoff relevant. The contri-
ution of the randomly selected member is derived calculating the average unconditional contribution of the other three
embers and ﬁnding the corresponding entry in their contribution table. This design has been frequently used to investigate
eterogeneity of subjects preferences for cooperation in public goods experiments (see, e.g., Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann
nd Thöni (2009), Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Fischbacher et al. (2012), Martinsson et al. (2013), Frackenpohl et al.
2016)). As we explain below, subjects are divided into types based on their contribution tables.
.1.3. Procedures
All the sessions were conducted at the University of Nottingham. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2015)).
n total, 592 subjects participated in the experiment. Before each part, subjects had to answer a set of control questions to
heck their understanding of the decision situations. To keep procedures in line with the original studies, Part 1 was  run
y pen and paper and Part 2 computerized using the software Ztree (Fischbacher (2007)). Subjects were paid the sum of
arnings from Part 1 and 2 and all feedbacks about the outcomes of the two parts were given at the end of Part 2 to avoid
ontamination of Part 2 behavior by Part 1 outcomes. Each session lasted approximately 75 min  and the average payment
as £ 7.20.
.2. Experimental results
As a ﬁrst step, we classify subjects according to their cooperation attitudes elicited in Part 2 of the experiment and we then
ook at betrayal aversion for each cooperation “type”. Based on their public goods contribution tables, we divide subjects into
hree types: conditional cooperators, free riders, and others. Following Fischbacher et al. (2001), “conditional cooperators”
xhibit either a monotonically increasing schedule of contributions or a positive  (signiﬁcant at 1% level) in the Spearman
orrelation test between the cell-entries of their contribution table and the average contribution levels of the other group
embers that deﬁne the cells. “Free riders” are subjects whose contribution table presents only zeros. All the remaining
ubjects are classiﬁed as “others”. In Fischbacher et al. (2001), “triangle contributors” constitute a fourth type. Because there
re very few in our sample, we include them in the category “others”.
Since we measure betrayal aversion only for the subjects who are assigned the role of ﬁrst mover in Part 1, the relevant
istribution of types for our purposes uses observations only from that subsample (n = 273).10 Consistent with previous
iterature (see Chaudhuri (2011)), conditional cooperators constitute the majority of our sample (59.7%), followed by free
iders (25.6%) and others (14.7%).
Table 1 reports the analysis of betrayal aversion for the entire sample and for each cooperation type. Overall, we observe
hat betrayal aversion is signiﬁcant in our sample (MWU-test, p = 0.031), but less prominent compared to the original studies
y Bohnet and co-authors (the average difference in MAPs between TG and RDG is 0.15 in Bohnet et al. (2008), compared with
ur ﬁgure of 0.05). However, we also notice that other studies using the same design have found smaller sizes of betrayal
version more in line with our results (0.07 in Hong and Bohnet (2007),11 0.08 in Dreber et al. (2013), 0.07 Butler and Miller
2014), and 0.04 in Aimone et al. (2015) using a within-subject version of the design).
Next we look at the relation between betrayal aversion and cooperation preferences from the public goods game. In
ontrast to our hypothesis, betrayal aversion is not signiﬁcantly different from zero for any type and, in particular, not for
onditional cooperators. A Kruskal-Wallis test on the distribution of MAPs across types cannot reject the null hypothesis of
he data being drawn from the same populations in both games (p = 0.719 and p = 0.327 for TG and RDG, respectively).
.3. DiscussionThe results of Study 1 suggest that betrayal aversion is not speciﬁcally a characteristic of conditional cooperators, as
pposed to other types. Yet, as discussed in Section 2, one potential limitation of this study is its vulnerability to concerns
10 This number also excludes double-switchers in the choice list table. For these subjects we  are not able to infer a MAP. The distribution of types of
hese  273 subjects is not signiﬁcantly different from the distribution of types for subjects who  were in the role of second movers (recipients) in Part 1 (2
2) = 3.30, p = 0.192). Thus, we can exclude any spillover effect of the role subjects were playing in Part 1 on Part 2 behavior.
11 This statistic is not reported in the paper. We  thank the authors for providing their data.
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Natural risk vignette
For personal reasons, you have to travel to a big city. From the airport you can choose between two taxi companies
to reach your final destination for which you don’t know the exact route. Company A charges you a fixed price of $12.
Company B charges you according to the taxi meter. If the weather is fine, it costs you $8. However, 1 out of 5 times,
due to bad weather conditions the ride takes longer and the fare is then $16.
Social risk vignette
For personal reasons, you have to travel to a big city. From the airport you can choose between two taxi companies
to reach your final destination for which you don’t know the exact route. Company A charges you a fixed price of $12.
Company B charges you according to the taxi meter. If the driver takes the direct route, it costs you $8. However, 1 out
of 5 drivers take detours to make  more money out of you and the fare is then $16.
about using the BDM mechanism to elicit betrayal aversion, such as that (i) the BDM might not be transparent to subjects and
hence generate noisy valuations, (ii) the obtained measure of betrayal aversion might be confounded (e.g. with loss aversion)
and (iii) the salience of the psychological mechanism driving betrayal aversion might be rather low as the BDM mechanism
is arguably very cognitively demanding. In the next section, we  introduce Study 2 where we  address these concerns by
investigating our research question with our second measure of betrayal aversion.
4. Study 2–a novel measure of betrayal aversion
For Study 2, we developed vignettes where we ask subjects to choose between a safe option and a risky option either in a
social risk situation with betrayal possibility or in a natural risk situation. The between-subjects comparison of hypothetical
willingness to take risks in these two scenarios constitutes our second measure of betrayal aversion.
4.1. Experimental design and procedures
Study 2 was conducted online using Amazon Mechanical Turk (see Horton et al. (2011)). The experiment was  composed
of two one-shot experiments. The ﬁrst was a strategy method public goods game experiment identical to the one used in
Study 1. The second game was a direct response one-shot public goods game where we also elicited incentivized beliefs
about the average contribution of the other three group members. After subjects made their decisions in these two games,
they were presented with one of the two following vignettes (bold font and titles were not presented to subjects):
After reading, subjects were asked to choose one of the two  companies. Notice that a risk neutral, cost minimizing, agent
would always choose Company B, which has an expected cost of $9.60. However, depending on their degree of risk aversion,
some decision makers may  choose Company A in the natural risk vignette. We  expect that the possibility of betrayal would
make our subjects more likely to choose Company A in the social risk vignette than they are in the natural risk vignette. We
will interpret such a ﬁnding as evidence of betrayal aversion. In the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 265), our use
of responses to hypothetical scenarios in this way rests on the premise that most subjects will (i) understand the decision
problems described; (ii) know what they would choose in them and (iii) have no reason to mislead us about these choices.
We think it likely that all three conditions are met  in our study.
In total, we had 359 subjects who were paid $2 for participating plus an additional bonus that depended on their earnings
from the two public goods games. The average bonus earnings were $ 2.56 and the experiment lasted on average 9 min.
4.2. Experimental results
The results from the classiﬁcation of cooperation types show a very high proportion of conditional cooperators compared
to the laboratory sample of Study 1. In particular, we  ﬁnd 79.7% conditional cooperators, 8.6% free riders and 11.7% others.
This is consistent with previous lab experiments on US subject pools (see e.g. Kocher et al. (2008)12).
The results from the vignettes reported in Table 2 indicate that, overall, participants are signiﬁcantly betrayal averse, as
shown by the percentage points difference in subjects choosing Company A (the safe option) between the two scenarios: the
percentage increases from 45% in the natural risk vignette to 63.7% in the social risk one (2(1) = 12.63, p < 0.001). In Table 2,
we also report the percentage of subjects in each type sample who choose Company A, separately for natural and social risk
vignettes. Statistical comparison reveals signiﬁcant betrayal aversion only for conditional cooperators and others, but not
for free riders.
12 In particular, they ﬁnd 80.6% conditional cooperators, 8.3% free riders and 11.1% others. This distribution is not statistically different from ours
(2(2) = 0.016, p = 0.992), which is reassuring for our methodology of using online experiments for this study. We thank the authors for supplying their
data.
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Table  2
Percentage choosing the safe option (Company A) for each cooperation type.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
All (n = 359) 64% 45% 19 <0.001
Conditional cooperators (n = 286) 63% 47% 16 0.007
Free  riders (n = 31) 50% 24% 26 0.125
Others (n = 42) 80% 50% 30 0.043
Note: p-values based on 2 test.
Table 3
Percentage of subjects choosing Company A – Study 3.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
All (n = 600) 57% 47% 10 0.014
Conditional cooperators (n = 458) 60% 46% 14 0.004
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.3. Discussion
These results reveal that, in Study 2, subjects are overall betrayal averse and conditional cooperators are betrayal averse,
s hypothesized. However, Study 2 has some limitations. First of all, the results are not conclusive for free riders and others
ue to the small number of observations in these categories. Second, the vignette task was  always conducted after the public
oods game with the potential danger of order or congruence effects. In Study 3, which we  present in the next section, we
ackle these two problems and also replicate Study 2.
. Study 3–Implementing our novel measure of betrayal aversion in a large sample
Study 3 uses the same design and vignettes of Study 2, but we present the tasks (public goods games and vignettes) in two
rders manipulated between subjects. Thus, we  have a 2 × 2 design that varies order and type of scenario (natural vs. social
isk). In the ﬁrst order, subjects made decisions for the vignettes ﬁrst and then in the public goods games; the second order
as like our Study 2 where subjects made choices for the public goods game ﬁrst and then for the vignettes. The experiment
as conducted online on Amazon Mechanical Turk with a large sample of 600 participants to allow us to make inferences
n free-riders and others. Incentives were the same as in Study 2.
.1. Experimental results
First, we investigate order effects keeping ﬁxed the type of vignette. In the natural risk vignette, we ﬁnd 45% of subjects
hoosing the safe option (Company A) when the vignette is presented before the public goods game and 49% when it is
resented afterwards. This difference is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels (n = 301, 2(1) = 0.407, p = 0.523). We  obtain a
imilar result in the social risk vignette as 57% of subjects choose the safe option both when the vignette is presented before
nd after the public goods game (n = 299, 2(1) = 0.007, p = 0.933). Given these results, we  pool the two orders in the data
nalysis below.
Next, we look at betrayal aversion in the whole sample. We  ﬁnd 57% subjects choosing the safe option in the social risk
ignette and 47% in the natural risk vignette (n = 600, 2(1) = 6.029, p = 0.014), indicating subjects are more averse to risks in
he social than in the natural risk vignette replicating the results of Study 2.13 With respect to classiﬁcation of types in the
ublic goods game we ﬁnd 76% conditional cooperators, 14% free riders and 10% others. Thus, Study 3 has a substantially
arger number of subjects of each type than Study 2.
In Table 3 we report betrayal aversion for the entire sample and for each type in the public goods game. Choice proportions
f conditional cooperators are very similar to Study 2 (compare Table 2). Conditional cooperators are signiﬁcantly betrayal
verse. Free riders and others are not. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the link between betrayal aversion and conditional cooperation
ound in Study 2.
.2. DiscussionThe results from Study 3 replicate the results of Study 2 for overall betrayal aversion and for betrayal aversion of con-
itional cooperators. Notwithstanding the larger sample size, they do not provide evidence of betrayal aversion for either
13 Each percentage is not signiﬁcantly different from the corresponding one found in Study 2 (social risk: 2(1) = 1.963, p = 0.161; natural risk: 2(1) = 0.215,
 = 0.643).
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free riders or others. Overall the results from Studies 2 and 3 conﬁrm the hypothesised association between conditional
cooperation and betrayal aversion.
6. Alternative categorizations of cooperation types
One feature of the analyses reported up to now is that they all use the measurement techniques and typology of
Fischbacher et al. (2001). In this section, we investigate the robustness of this approach by (i) allowing different classi-
ﬁcation of individuals’ attitudes to cooperation and (ii) enriching the classiﬁcation with an index of willingness to take social
risk in the public goods game.
The ﬁrst exercise is intended to check the robustness of results to variations in the way we classify cooperation types
in the public goods game. In particular, we deﬁne free riders using weaker criteria. In the original Fischbacher et al. (2001)
classiﬁcation, a subject is classiﬁed as free rider only if they ﬁll their contribution table with zeros. We  now consider two
alternative classiﬁcations that allow “free riders” to be mildly or occasionally cooperative. In one, we classify subjects as
free riders if their maximum entry in the contribution table is less than 3 tokens and, in the other, if their average entry in
the contribution table is less than 3 tokens.14 The classiﬁcation criteria for conditional cooperators are unchanged and if a
subject ﬁts with both conditional cooperators and free rider criteria, we classify them as a free rider. Subjects are classiﬁed
as ‘others’ if they are categorized neither as a free rider nor as a conditional cooperator.
We conduct the same analyses as are reported in Sections 3–5 and report the results in Tables A1–A6 in the Appendix
A. All main results reported in previous sections are replicated according to the new classiﬁcation criteria. As before, we do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant betrayal aversion for any of the types in Study 1. In Study 2, conditional cooperators are signiﬁcantly
betrayal averse no matter how we change the deﬁnition of free riders. Free riders are signiﬁcantly betrayal averse according
to classiﬁcation (i) above but not according to (ii). Others are mildly betrayal averse in Study 2. As stressed in Section 4
however, the results for free riders and others in Study 2 must be taken carefully because of the low number of observations.
In Study 3, conditional cooperators are signiﬁcantly betrayal averse under all classiﬁcation criteria while free riders and
others are not (see Tables A1–A5 in the Appendix A). We  conclude that our results are robust to changes in the classiﬁcation
of free rider types considered.
Next, we ask whether considering only cooperation attitudes might miss some elements of the link between conditional
cooperation and betrayal aversion. In particular, it is arguable that cooperation attitudes elicited with the Fischbacher et al.
(2001) conditional contribution tasks do not reveal willingness to take social risks as the strategy method removes strategic
uncertainty from the public goods game by, in effect, structuring the game as sequential. This could be a concern in the context
of establishing a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion, when the latter interpreted as a behavioral
trait that inhibits the taking of social risks.
As a direct measure of social risk taking in the public goods game, we  now use the unconditional contributions elicited
in the Fischbacher et al. (2001) design and combine them with the standard classiﬁcation of subjects obtained from the
conditional decisions. (For clarity, we stress that we  will still refer to subjects as conditional cooperators, if they are so
classiﬁed on the basis of their contribution tables.) Unconditional contributions reﬂect how much subjects expose themselves
to the risk of exploitation by groupmates who contribute less than they do. We  expect stronger betrayal aversion among
conditional cooperators who contribute little unconditionally than among those who  contribute more unconditionally,
as low unconditional contributions protect against exploitation, while high unconditional contributions leave the subject
exposed to the risk of being exploited.
We investigate this conjecture using OLS regressions. For Study 1, we  regress the variable MAP  (minimum acceptance
probability) on a treatment dummy  SR (social risk; =1 if the observation is collected in TG), on the variable Unconditional
Contribution and on the interaction term between SR and Unconditional Contribution. For each of Studies 2 and 3, we  regress
the variable SAFE (=1 if the subjects chose Company A, i.e., the safe company in our vignettes) on a treatment dummy SR (=1
if subject was exposed to the social risk vignette), on the variable Unconditional Contribution and on the interaction term
between SR and Unconditional Contribution. For each study, we  report the results for conditional cooperators in Table 4.15
We  are mainly interested in the treatment variable (SR) that reveals betrayal aversion for individuals contributing 0
tokens unconditionally and the interaction term (SR × Unconditional Contribution) indicating how betrayal aversion changes
as the unconditional contribution increases. In all three studies, we ﬁnd the treatment dummy  to be positive and signiﬁcant
(although at the 10% level in Studies 2 and 3). This indicates that conditional cooperators who  contribute 0 unconditionally
are betrayal averse in all studies. If betrayal aversion decreases as social risk taking increases, as hypothesized, we should
expect the interaction term to be negative and signiﬁcant. This is conﬁrmed in Study 1 but, despite the sign being in the
14 These modiﬁcations are sensible as in the original Fischbacher et al. (2001)’s classiﬁcation, some subjects who are arguably closer to a free riding
behavior are classiﬁed as conditional cooperators as for example subjects who have only one monotonic increase by one token and no decrease in their
contribution schedule. We  thank the editor for suggesting these alternative classiﬁcation criteria.
15 We do not use Probit or Logit models in our Studies 2 and 3 despite having a binary dependent variable as we are mainly interested in the interaction
term  in the regression. As noted by Ai and Norton (2003), the coefﬁcient of the interaction term using Probit and Logit models would be not interpretable
using  a standard software package; hence, we prefer using linear probability models (see also Angrist and Pischke (2008)).
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Table  4
The relation between conditional cooperation, unconditional contributions and betrayal aversion.
Dependent variable Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
MAP  SAFE SAFE
SR 0.140** 0.203* 0.140*
(0.055) (0.108) (0.077)
Unconditional
Contribution
0.005 -0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
SR  × Unconditional
Contribution
-0.009* -0.004 -0.0002
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant 0.427*** 0.516*** 0.412***
(0.035) (0.082) (0.056)
N  163 286 458
Notes: OLS regressions; dependent variables: MAP  (minimum acceptance probability) in Study 1 and SAFE dummy (=1 if Company A is chosen) for Study
2  and 3.* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table A1
Robustness check 1–Study 1, free riders deﬁned as maximum conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
MAPTG MAPRDG MAPTG − MAPRDG p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 156) 0.53 [0.21] 0.48 [0.20] 0.05 0.161
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hFree  riders (n = 80) 0.49 [0.22] 0.43 [0.21] 0.06 0.197
Others (n = 37) 0.57 [0.21] 0.50 [0.19] 0.07 0.330
ote: average MAPs [Std. Dev.]; p-values based on Mann-Whitney U (MWU)  test.
ight direction in Studies 2 and 3, the interaction term is not signiﬁcant in those cases.16 Hence, we  conclude that our second
easure of betrayal aversion does not seem to be related to the willingness to take social risk as reﬂected by unconditional
ontributions.
. Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we have reported the results of three studies that investigate whether there is a link between betrayal
version and conditional cooperation, two concepts studied up to now in distinct strands of the experimental literature.
e have employed two different methods to measure betrayal aversion. In Study 1, we  relied on a tool introduced in the
conomics literature by Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) that measures betrayal aversions using a version of the Becker-
eGroot-Marschak mechanism. In Studies 2 and 3, we  introduced a novel method based on vignettes that simpliﬁes
ubstantially the measurement and elicitation of betrayal aversion.
While we do not ﬁnd support for an association between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion in Study 1, we do
nd it in Study 2 and in Study 3. In Section 6, we have conﬁrmed the robustness of our results to alternative classiﬁcations
f subjects’ dispositions in public goods games. As discussed in Section 2, we  think that our use of vignettes has impor-
ant advantages over the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. To this extent, our ﬁndings provide strong evidence of an
ssociation between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. Of course, they do not indicate a speciﬁc direction of
ausality. Nevertheless, we conjecture that, rather than there being a unidirectional causal chain from one phenomenon to
he other, each of conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion reﬂects a more basic aversion to intentional exploitation.
ppendix A.
In this Appendix we report several robustness checks as described in Section 6. Tables A1 and A2 should be compared to
able 1; Tables A3 and A4 should be compared to Table 2; and Tables A5 and A6 to Table 3. In each case, as indicated by its
eader, the table below uses a different typology of subjects than the one used in the main text.
Table A7 should be compared to Table 4. It uses subjects’ beliefs about the unconditional contributions of others in place
f their own unconditional contribution, as an alternative indicator of social risk taking in the public goods game.
16 An alternative approach is to use beliefs about the average contribution of the three other group members as a measure of social risk taking. For
onditional cooperators, consistent with their attitude, unconditional contributions and beliefs are highly correlated (correlation coefﬁcients are 0.77, 0.55,
.65  in Studies 1, 2, and 3, respectively; all p-values <0.001). The results using beliefs instead of unconditional contributions are similar to the ones reported
ere  and reported in Table A7 in the Appendix A.
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Table A2
Robustness check 2–Study 1, free riders deﬁned as average conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
MAPTG MAPRDG MAPTG − MAPRDG p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 135) 0.52 [0.20] 0.48 [0.20] 0.04 0.346
Free  riders (n = 114) 0.51 [0.23] 0.45 [0.20] 0.06 0.113
Others  (n = 24) 0.59 [0.23] 0.48 [0.17] 0.11 0.283
Note: average MAPs [Std. Dev.]; p-values based on Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test.
Table A3
Robustness check 1–Study 2, free riders deﬁned as maximum conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 284) 62% 47% 15 0.009
Free  riders (n = 34) 56% 22% 34 0.042
Others  (n = 41) 80% 52% 28 0.062
Note: percentage of subjects choosing Company A; p-values based on 2 test.
Table A4
Robustness check 2–Study 2, free riders deﬁned as average conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 270) 63% 45% 18 0.004
Free  riders (n = 50) 55% 39% 16 0.283
Others  (n = 39) 80% 53% 27 0.070
Note: percentage of subjects choosing Company A; p-values based on 2 test.
Table A5
Robustness check 1–Study 3, free riders deﬁned as maximum conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 455) 60% 46% 14 0.002
Free  riders (n = 88) 29% 36% −7 0.492
Others  (n = 57) 72% 80% −8 0.479
Note: percentage of subjects choosing Company A; p-values based on 2 test.
Table A6
Robustness check 2–Study 3, free riders deﬁned as average conditional contribution less than 3 tokens.
Social Risk Natural Risk Percentage points difference p-value
Conditional cooperators (n = 420) 61% 45% 16 0.001
Free  riders (n = 134) 41% 43% −2 0.794
Others  (n = 46) 67% 81% −14 0.242
Note: percentage of subjects choosing Company A; p-values based on 2 test.
Table A7
The relation between conditional cooperation, beliefs and betrayal aversion.
Dependent variable Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
MAP  SAFE SAFE
SR 0.151** 0.263** 0.131
(0.062) (0.131) (0.101)
Beliefs 0.006 −0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
SR  × Beliefs −0.010* −0.011 0.0003
(0.005) (0.012) (0.009)
Constant 0.417*** 0.507*** 0.429***
(0.040) (0.102) (0.071)
N  163 286 458
Notes: OLS regressions; dependent variables: MAP  (minimum acceptance probability) in Study 1 and safe choice dummy (=1 if Company A is chosen) for
Study  2 and 3.* signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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ppendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data experimental instructions, software, data and analysis ﬁles associated with this article can be found,
n the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.06.013.
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